The Civil War battle site of Monroe's 
Crossroads
is located a few miles south of Normandy Dropzone on the border of
Coleman Impact Area. Archeology conducted by the 
National
Parks Service in 1995 resulted in the publication of a staff
ride and popular
history of the battle. Individuals or groups interested in a
visit to the site must first coordinate access with Range Control
(423-6772)
and/or our office. No metal detecting is allowed at the site.
Violators will be charged with a federal criminal offense and will be
subject to the seizure of their vehicle and equipment as well as facing
significant fines and/or jail sentence.
Download the .pdf file of "Cavalry
Clash in the Sandhills"
An exhibit case
displaying some of the artifacts from the battle can be viewed at the Cultural
Resources Program Office.
The large oil paintings (pictures below)
illustrating the battle were done in 1998 by Martin Pate of Newnan,
Georgia and can be viewed at the Throckmorton
Library.
BATTLE HISTORY
SETTING
THE STAGE
In
February of 1865, Union General Sherman and his Federal force of 60,000
men were moving from Columbia, South Carolina north towards Charlotte,
North Carolina where Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had assumed
command of the Army of Tennessee. The
only organized Confederate forces in the area were Lieutenant General
William J. Hardee’s Infantry Corps of 8,000 and Lieutenant General
Joseph Wheeler and Major General Matthew C. Butler’s Cavalry that were
combined on March 8th under Lieutenant General Wade Hampton and totaled
approximately 5,800.
GEN Sherman chose to swing east towards
Fayetteville to allow resupply from Wilmington, destroy the arsenal (now
the site of the Museum of the Cape Fear), threaten Raleigh and
eventually link up with other Federal forces from the coast in
Goldsboro. GEN Sherman
delayed indicating his intentions in the hope of trapping the
Confederate forces on the west side of the Cape Fear River by beating
them into Fayetteville and seizing the bridge.
Major General Kilpatrick operated well forward and to the left of
the main Federal force as if scouting the route to Charlotte, with the
intention of turning east at the last possible moment.
GEN
Johnston hoped to use his cavalry to isolate a wing of Sherman’s army
and destroy it causing a delay in Sherman’s movement, and allowing him
to consolidate the Confederate forces.
Thus, LTG Wheeler and MG Butler were under order to attack the
wing of Sherman’s army should the opportunity present itself.
MARCH
9, 1865 APPROACHING
THE CAMP
Hampered by rain and harassed by
Confederate Patrols, Kilpatrick’s Division was strung out and
scattered, but moving east along Morganton Road.
The 1st Brigade, furthest back, had been instructed to proceed
down Chicken Road in the hopes of blocking the Confederate Cavalry.
Kilpatrick’s scouts entered the camp at Monroe’s Crossroads
in the morning and camped south of Nicholson Creek to await the rest of
the Division. The 3rd and 4th Brigades as well as a section of artillery
from the 10th Wisconsin Light Battery arrived next around 2100.
Kilpatrick, his staff and a detail from the 3rd Brigade had
stayed behind to direct the 2nd Brigade to follow along Morganton Road
after it had closed up. Kilpatrick
and his escort were also approaching the camp.
MG
Butler’s advance guard arrived at the intersection of Yadkin and
Morganton Roads. They noted
that at least a mounted brigade had passed the spot very recently.
As they discussed the situation, Kilpatrick’s advance guard
also arrived at the intersection and was promptly captured.
Kilpatrick and his escorts, following a short distance behind,
narrowly made their escape through the woods to the south, skirting the
Confederate units and reentering Morganton Road to the east where they
proceeded on to the camp. The Union scouts had not detected the Confederate Cavalry
thus leading Kilpatrick to believe that the incident at the intersection
and the sporadic gunfire to the west was the result of a chance
encounter with a Confederate patrol.
Brevet Brigadier 
General
Atkins and the 2nd Brigade, also moving east toward camp behind
Kilpatrick came upon the rear of Butler’s Division.
They were undetected by the Confederates. Realizing the road ahead was blocked, they countermarched in
order to find a way around. Soon
the brigade was mired down in the swamp of Piney Bottom Creek.
To the south, three divisions of GEN Sherman’s infantry entered
Plank Road, and were also moving east.
PROPOSED ATTACK POSITION
Throughout the rainy night the Confederates
scouted the Federal camp determining the exact location of each unit and
their commands. 
MG
Kilpatrick and his female companion, along with her mother and several
other officers were quartered in the Monroe house (currently
unoccupied). The Union
officers were tired, wet, and confident that the war would soon end in
their favor. They were not
as diligent in their defense of the camp as they should have been.
Guards had been set out in the direction of Fayetteville, but few
to the 
west
and none to the north where the Confederates were now approaching.
Confederate Captain Shannon and his scouts succeeded in capturing
the only guards to the west without a shot, leaving the entire north and
west sides of the camp open to Confederate reconnaissance.
The Confederate scouts were able to go right into the Union camp
and lead horses away without being detected.
Hampton
proposed a dawn attack led by Butler’s Division from the north,
Wheeler’s Corps from the northwest and Hume’s Division from the west
across a small tributary of Nicholson Creek. LTG Hampton further gave
control of the battle to LTG Wheeler to carry out as planned leaving
himself and BG Dibrell in reserve.
To the east the Union 2nd Brigade had extracted
themselves from the swamp and were moving again down Morganton Road.
The Union 1st Brigade, farthest back, was just departing Bethesda
Church moving toward Chicken Road.
“CAVALRY IN THE CAMP!”
LTG Wheeler gave the command:
“The Walk!” and the 
command
moved out spurred on by the bugler. Wheeler
shouted “The Trot!” and
after a few short minutes “The Gallop!”.
The full momentum of hundreds of gray horsemen in columns of
regiments was now bearing down on the awakening Federals.
They swept past the house and into the camp, firing pistols and
slashing with sabers. The
Confederate
POWs were the first to realize an attack was underway and began to make
their escape towards the attacking Confederates.
Before they could be identified some were shot by their comrades. Many attacking Confederates were confused thinking the first
line had been repulsed. The
attack so surprised the Federals that they could do little more than flee
south where the swamps of Nicholson Creek stopped their retreat. The Confederates completely overran the camp stopping only
when the Federals seemed to be completely run off.
The prospect of much loot in the camp became their primary concern.
Turning back into the camp they encountered still more fleeing
Federals. Confusion reigned
and hand to hand combat was common.
“WHERE IS GENERAL KILPATRICK?”
During the night planning of the battle at
least 
three Confederate officers developed plans for
the capture of MG Kilpatrick. During
the melee of the battle however, only Confederate Captain Bostick had the
chance to carry out his orders. MG
Kilpatrick had come out to the porch just before the attack, but was not
yet in uniform. CPT Bostick
rode up with the first wave of the attack and, not recognizing GEN
Kilpatrick, demanded “Where is General Kilpatrick?”.
Kilpatrick, realizing his luck replied “There he goes on that
horse!” and CPT Bostick and his escort quickly rode off after an
unfortunate officer who was making his escape down Blue’s Road.
Kilpatrick ran for the cover of the woods and swamp to the south of
camp, joining up with most of his units there.
CONFEDERATE RIGHT BOGS DOWN
Confederate BG Humes to the west had also
attacked at the sound of the bugle, but was immediately repulsed by dense
thicket and heavy fire from the Federal 1st Alabama Cavalry. This unit was
in the southern portion of the camp, and had not received the brunt of the
initial attack. BG Hume’s division, in their night maneuver to attack
position had positioned themselves west of not one, but two of the
tributaries to Nicholson Creek. He
was now aware that they were attempting to attack across an impenetrable
swamp. BG Humes ordered his attack to pull back and move north to
find an easier crossing.
FEDERAL COUNTERATTACK
The Federal soldiers now floundering neck deep in the
swamps south of camp broke off their flight and, encouraged by the arrival
of Kilpatrick
and other soldiers made their way back to the edge
of the camp. As the Federal
veterans began to organize their line and prepare the weapons they had
instinctively grabbed in flight they were joined by Kilpatrick’s Scouts,
who had camped south of Nicholson Creek and were now just arriving after
hearing the gunfire.
CONFEDERATES SCRAMBLE FOR SUPPLIES
In camp, order was impossible to maintain as hundreds
of hungry and ill-clothed Confederates intermingled in the confined area
of the camp in a desperate attempt to collect food and supplies.
LTG Wheeler ordered some of his men to begin pulling away the guns,
but this endeavor was stopped short as the rapid firing Spencer carbines
of the reorganized Federal lines to the south began to take their toll on
the Confederates in the camp. Unable
to reorganize the scattered Confederate units in the camp, LTG Wheeler
sent for BG Dibrell to bring the reserve forward.
As the Federals continued their advancing fire into the camp
couriers soon returned to LTG Wheeler with the news that LTG Hampton had
already brought the reserves onto the field, and they too were now
scattered and useless to the Confederate commanders.
STETSON REACHES THE GUNS
In the confusion, First Lieutenant Ebenezer
Stetson,
commanding the Federal artillery section, managed to reach his 3 inch
Hotchiss gun and fire. Inspired,
the Federals surged forward and other gunners joined him. The Confederates reacted quickly, cutting down the 
exposed
gunners and gathering together for a counterattack. Led by LTG Wheeler, elements of Allen’s Division again
charged into the camp only to meet a withering fire from the Federal
carbines. The charge was
broken off, reformed and another attempt was made only to be repulsed even
more decisively than the first. Upon
seeing LTG Wheeler’s charges repulsed, LTG Butler attempted his own with
elements of Young’s Brigade but was met by a
barrage of canister fire. LTG
Wheeler and LTG Hampton quickly conferred and decided that in view of the
probability that Federal Infantry would soon be on the scene withdrawal
would be prudent. Exhaustion,
lack of ammunition and no encouragement from their commanders prevented a
Union pursuit.
AFTERMATH
MG Kilpatrick and his men hurriedly buried the dead
and moved out traveling south on Blues Rosin Road to Plank Road and then
east toward Fayetteville.
The
Confederate Cavalry moved slowly into Fayetteville and established camp at
the arsenal, allowing the wounded to be treated at local hospitals and
homes. On the morning of
March 11, with Sherman’s army closing in, the Confederates evacuated
Fayetteville and crossed the Cape Fear leaving a few Cavalry to burn the
bridge as the Federals approached.
The Battle
of Monroe’s Crossroads was over by 0900 on the morning of March 10,
leaving perhaps 200 dead and a larger number of wounded and prisoners.
Official reports and accounts written long after the war vary greatly in
the numbers of casualties and captures.
